autonomy of some units in exchange for the advantages of joint action and resources, thereby reducing other loss of autonomy that might result from environmental dependence and uncertainty (Cook et al. 1983 ). The degree of coercion varies across a spectrum, ranging from ownership, through joint ventures and contracting, to informal agreements (Alex ander and Morrisey 1989; Longest 1990) . Links vary in freedom of entry (Longest 1990 ), but all involve ceding autonomy; and even low-structure, freely entered links carry pressures to conform to dominant or influential models.
Coercive systems also restrain nonprofits from acting like for-profits, however (Clarke and Estes 1991) . Even when pressures on for-profits and nonprofits are similar, factors like mission statements and ideologies of boards of directors may push nonprofits into a different response: for example, they may be constrained to handle excess demand through waiting lists, whereas for-profits are freer to employ pricing structure (Weisbrod 1988 ). Weisbrod's government-failure theory argues that nonprofits are expected to fill the gaps left unfilled by government, while their ability to do so is constrained by their tax status.
Although simultaneously operating factors can promote both isomor phism and differentiation, strong isomorphic processes push the bound aries of HHAs toward the limits allowed by coercive structures: ideologies of business efficiency substitute for service to community; reg ulators, payors, and legislators enforce adoption of for-profit practices to the limit allowed by law; professional standards consonant with forprofit practice dominate; nonprofits mimic for-profits, and vice versa, within bounds allowed by tax codes. At the extreme, a nonprofit's tax status is changed to create a for-profit. Thus, isomorphic processes erode the structures that differentiate nonprofit from for-profit HHAs.
If mimetic, normative, and coercive forms of isomorphism induce dif ferent responses, relative strengths of different isomorphic forms can be tested. Within coercive structures (e.g., chain membership), coercive iso morphism suggests a more monolithic response than that of mimetic iso morphism, whereas mimicry has a uniform nature, cutting across such structures. Normative isomorphism may be stronger in certain areas (e.g., patient care), weaker in others (e.g., reimbursement). Competitive iso morphism derives from environmental rather than organizational factors. Insofar as agencies in an area are induced by their environment to act in similar ways, they may be less differentiated by organization-specific fac Privatization a n d Access to Home Health Care 181 tors; the actions of for-profits and nonprofits may converge under certain environmental conditions.
Research on Access to Care by Privatization and Rationalization
Although both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals select patients so as to avoid unprofitable care and to dump the uninsured on public providers (Gray 1986) , some find other tax-status variation among hospitals in un compensated care, with nonprofit hospitals providing more care than for-profits to low-income uninsured (Lewin, Eckles, and Miller 1988) . Marmor, Schlesinger, and Smithey (1987) note that for-profits are more likely to engage in patient selection or other methods to avoid unprofit able care. For-profits may avoid low-income and attract high-income pa tients by relocating (Bays 1983; Homer, Bradham, and Rushefsky 1984; Schlesinger et al. 1987) ; not providing unprofitable services, no matter how cost effective (Nutter 1984) or beneficial (Kaluzny et al. 1970; Cromwell and Kanak 1982; Shortell et al. 1986; Schlesinger et al. 1987) ; screening out or discouraging admission of persons unable to pay (Mar mor, Schlesinger, and Smithey 1987) ; and being unresponsive to the need for sliding scales and uncompensated care (Gray 1986; Schlesinger and Dorwart 1984; Schlesinger 1986; Sloan, Valvona, and Mullner 1986; Schlesinger et al. 1987; Lewin, Eckles, and Miller 1988) .
Research suggests that system members are more able than nonmem bers to subsidize unprofitable services (Vladeck 1981; Brown 1982) and to acquire capital and subsidize unprofitable locations based on profit ability elsewhere (Coyne 1982; Cohodes and Kinkhead 1984; Ermann and Gabel 1984; Schlesinger et al. 1987) . System members may be less affected by local concerns, such as the need to provide charity care (Starkweather 1971; Ermann and Gabel 1984; Schlesinger et al. 1987) , and more attuned to financial incentives (Mullner and Hadley 1984; Er mann and Gabel 1984) .
Coercive and normative isomorphism can operate simultaneously, and mimetic isomorphism may be stronger, within systems, suggesting that isomorphism will push nonprofits to resemble for-profits in systems. Taken together, these processes should lead to convergence of for-profits regardless of system membership and of both for-profit and nonprofit system members.
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Researchers' intensified interest in the processes of isomorphism, the ambiguity of earlier findings, and the speed and degree of health indus try change offer an opportunity to test theory on a health care issue of increasing salience: access to posthospital home health care.
The Research Problem
Our analysis addresses an important issue in services for the aged: access to home health care. We considers the effects on home health access of tax status (nonprofit or for-profit); organizational integration (system or free standing); environmental competitiveness (volume and market con centration of HHAs); substitute care (nursing-home beds per aged pop ulation); demand (percentage of the population that is aged); and state policy (home health certificate of need [CON] ).
The Study
Data were collected in a 1984-87 study of the effects of the prospective payment system (PPS) on community-based care: clients, services, staff, structure, and budgets of six types of community providers. The HHA sample consisted of 185 HHAs randomly selected from nine metropolitan areas in five states: San Francisco-Oakland and San Diego, California; Dallas-Fort Worth and Houston, Texas; Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Seattle, Washington; and Tampa-St. Petersburg. Florida. Respondent HHAs were selected randomly by metropolitan area from frames comprising all HHAs on provider lists supplied by state licensing and certification agencies in the five study states, county lists, and rele vant state and local trade association lists. Data from HHA directors, or their designated representatives, were collected during two 45-minute telephone surveys conducted 18 months apart, in 1986 and 1987 , that achieved response rates of 92 percent in the first year and 89 percent in the second. Validity and reliability data checks assured consistency and accuracy from one year to the next. Because there are only nine public agencies, they were excluded from analysis, so privatization can be con sidered just in terms of access to nonprofit versus for-profit institutions, and not to public versus nonpublic facilities.
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Health care access involves "those dimensions which describe the po tential and actual entry of a given population to the health care system" (Anderson et al. 1983) . Two themes affecting access are population char acteristics and the delivery system (Anderson et al. 1983) .
Access measures derive from items addressing various behavioral di mensions of access to services: agency policies, refusals to serve clients, and other procedures and characteristics of operation. This is not a study of service use patterns (i.e., objective measures of realized access, indi cated by volume of services consumed relative to need). Rather, it pro vides behavioral and perceptual data on the likelihood that HHAs limit or refuse to provide services to particular types of clients or under partic ular conditions. The four access measures used here are reports of the following:
1. increases in fees or copayments 2. tightening of eligibility for services 3. refusals to serve some types of clients 4. refusals for financial reasons Data collection occurred during a time of great change and growth in the home health industry. Our findings do not reflect the effects of sub sequent important changes: massive continued growth in expenditures, the short-lived Catastrophic Health Care Act, and the implementation of resource-based relative value scale reimbursement for physicians.
Hypotheses
Environmental and organizational characteristics should predict reported HHA access. Table 1 most HHAs are competing with larger HHAs. High values of both mea sures represent conditions in which it is hypothesized that many HHAs admit whatever clientele they can. State home health CON regulation erects market-entry barriers that reduce competition; thus, the impact of CON is opposite that of number of HHAs. CON does more than limit competition, however, because it also represents the planning required of HHAs in order to justify their actions, leaving them less free to tighten eligibility; thus, this access measure has no directional hypoth esis. When demand is higher (a larger population of aged persons, fewer nursing-home beds), HHAs are freer to raise access barriers.
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System-member (chain or multifacility system) HHAs are hypothe sized to be better able to increase fees, tighten eligibility, and refuse ser vices. For-profit HHAs are hypothesized to be less likely to offer services for high-need clients, but better able to compete in targeted service areas and thus more likely to increase fees, tighten eligibility, and refuse ser vices. For nonprofits that are independent, free-standing HHAs, the tra ditions of nonprofit provision are more likely to remain intact; they are hypothesized to be less likely than for-profit HHAs to refuse services to persons who need them, even those who find it difficult to pay for these services. In accord with the theory of institutional isomorphism, we pre dicted that nonprofit-system-affiliated HHAs will behave like for-profit HHAs, that is, they will increase fees and copayments and refuse ser vices. If there is organizational isomorphism, nonprofit-for-profit differ ences will be nonexistent or smaller among HHAs in systems than among free-standing HHAs. Hence, independent HHAs should be less likely to increase fees, tighten eligibility, and refuse services.
The competitive-isomorphism argument is that environment induces divergent HHAs to act similarly. With greater market concentration, for-profits and nonprofits should operate similarly. Thus, when an in teraction between the Herfindahl index and for-profit status is part of the equation, it should have a sign opposite that denoting for-profit status in order to show less tax-status difference at higher concentration. Another interpretation hypothesizes the same findings, arguing that with higher concentration, for-profits are induced to accept less profitable cli ents, thereby increasing access, whereas nonprofits find it more difficult to subsidize unprofitable clients, and so reduce access, leading to con vergence in the behavior of nonprofits and for-profits. HHAs may also mimic dominant agency types whose behavior becomes more homoge nous wherever either nonprofit or for-profit HHAs predominate ("agency imbalance"). Table 2 gives means and standard deviations for major variables. Table 3 presents data on service refusals in which tax status is crossed by system membership. HHA directors were asked, "What types of clients referred to you, if any, cannot be served by your agency?"; responses were coded according to whether they referred to payment/reimbursement issues. This item was asked in 1986 regarding the 1984-86 period (PPS imple mentation period) and in 1987 regarding 1986-87 (post-PPS implemen tation period). Differences in refusals are not strong, but they suggest that being both for-profit and a system member increases the likelihood of an HHA refusing a client for payment reasons. Data for 1987 show weak evidence of change in that both for-profit status and system mem bership increase the likelihood of refusals, but being both does not in crease the likelihood proportionately-a pattern that conforms with the isomorphism argument. Thus, in 1987, for-profit status increases the likelihood of client refusal among independent HHAs, but not among for-profit system members. Further, a greater likelihood of refusal by HHAs that are nonprofit system members than by nonprofit independents suggests that, within systems, nonprofits behave more like for-profits. Analysis reported below, however, also controls for area measures to pro vide stronger conclusions about effects of agency factors. Table 4 reports multivariate logistic regressions. Market factors, HHA tax status, and system membership explain access. Using 1984-86 client refusals to predict 1987 refusals (last column), the latter becomes a mea sure of change in refusals, except that 1984-86 refusals become a conti nuity measure. The 1984-86 measure shows no effect on 1986-87 refusals, suggesting that HHAs that previously limited access through
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Carroll L. Estes and James H. Swan client refusals did not necessarily do so later. There is no evidence that either tax status or system membership affects fee increases or tightening of eligibility. Similarly, regarding refusal of services for financial reasons among nonsystem members in 1984-86, nonprofits do not differ from for-profits, and, among nonprofits, system members do not differ from nonsystem members. Results differ for 1986-87, with for-profits being more likely than nonprofits, and chain than nonchain HHAs, to refuse 2. 89 services. Thus, by 1987, hypotheses of greater service refusals by propri etary and system HHAs are strongly supported. Consistent with a hypothesis of organizational isomorphism, nonprof its and for-profits become more alike within systems. Thus, in addition to positive effects of for-profit and system status, an interaction should have a sign opposite to, but of about the same magnitude as, that for for-profit status. Findings for 1984-86 are complex. Although the effect of the interaction is significant, with a sign opposite that for proprietary status, the latter coefficient is not significant. Thus, for 1984-86, only system members show a difference for tax status: both for-profits and system members were more likely than all other HHAs to refuse services. Many nonprofit system members may have been new to system member ship in 1986, so had not yet come to act like for-profits (nonprofits hav ing not yet been "socialized" to system norms of refusing services); this does not explain, however, why nonsystem for-profits and nonprofits do not appear to differ.
For 1986-87, the interaction coefficient is negative and of similar mag nitude to that for tax status, supporting an institutional isomorphism ar gument: HHAs within coercive structures remained similar in terms of access, whereas those outside such structures differentiated by tax status. However, the fact that the coefficients for system membership and tax status were not significant in 1984-86, but were for 1986-87, suggests another change between the two periods: HHAs generally became more differentiated along system and tax-status lines. This raises questions about the institutional isomorphism argument in this case.
Negative effects for the Herfindahl suggest that HHAs facing greater market concentration are unlikely to tighten eligibility or refuse services. Effects for HHAs per population suggest that HHAs in more competitive markets are also less likely to reduce access in these ways. Findings for percentage aged are as expected regarding fee increases, but they contra dict the hypotheses for all other access measures. It may be that political and normative expectations are more important than demand consider ations when HHAs make decisions regarding service refusal and eligibil ity. As expected, where there are more nursing-home beds, HHAs are less likely to refuse services for financial reasons. Where nursing-home supply is greater, some individuals who could neither pay for nor find coverage for home health services will have entered nursing homes under Medicaid coverage, and thus have not been either referred for home 19°Carroll L. Estes and James H. Swan health services (Swan and Benjamin 1990) By mimicry, access differences by tax status should converge where ei ther for-profit or nonprofits predominate. Measures of HHA imbalance and its interaction with tax status are entered in table 6 (the interaction of tax status with system membership is excluded because of collinearity). The imbalance interaction has an effect opposite that of tax status, but the signs are the reverse of what was expected, perhaps because of collinearity (the sign for tax-status changes from table 5). so findings of fer weak support at best for a mimetic isomorphism argument.
Conclusions
Findings indicate that tax status, organizational complexity (chain/system membership), and selected environmental factors (competition, concentration, and demand) affect HHA decisions limiting access. Study findings illustrate the importance of local market factors in explaining how HHAs deal with access to care. Findings show that environmental competition (number of HHAs per 1,000 population) and concentration (Herfindahl index) influence access to HHA services. Where there are more HHAs per population, so that any one agency confronts more com petitors, and where there is greater inequality of agency size, so that most HHAs compete with a few large agencies, individual HHAs are less likely to refuse services. Thus, where HHAs face more environmental pressures, they tend toward less selectivity in access, and for-profits and nonprofits tend to act more alike. Where there are more nursing-home beds per population, a measure of available supply of the principal alternative service to home health care, HHAs are less likely to refuse services to cli- ents for financial reasons. Thus, where HHAs face greater availability of an alternate service, they tend to be more accessible. Contrary to hypothesis, with more of the aged in the population (a measure of service demand) HHAs are less likely to have refused services for financial reasons. Perhaps the population density of the old old (e.g., persons 85 or older) would be a better demand variable for HHA ser- vices; or perhaps other pressures in communities with high densities of people 65 and older mitigate against using refusals as access barriers. Tax status and system membership do not predict HHA behavior in 1984-86, but in 1987 results predicted HHAs' refusing clients for financial reasons, as well as changing such behavior between 1986 and 1987. Thus, in the later period, independent, free-standing for-profits are much more
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likely to refuse services than their counterpart, independent nonprofit HHAs; however, tax status differences disappear when we compare forprofit and nonprofit HHAs that are system members. This finding and those for change over time provide evidence for the isomorphism argument that as nonprofit HHAs become part of complex bureaucratic systems, they are likely to take on characteristics and behaviors of these systems, becoming more like for-profits. There may also be moderating of forprofit behavior or movement over time toward a lower tendency to refuse services (service refusals are lower for all tax and membership statuses in 1986-87 than in 1984-86), perhaps reflecting systemwide decision mak ing or buffering from competitive environments afforded by member ship: a process compatible with isomorphism but emphasizing for-profit rather than nonprofit change.
The isomorphism argument is unsupported in 1984-86. Consistent with simple findings in table 4, it was within systems in the earlier pe riod that nonprofits and for-profits differed in service refusals for finan cial reasons, whereas in 1986-87 it was among system members that there was no difference by tax status. Perhaps in 1984-86, when PPS was implemented and the process of consolidation of HHAs into systems was less advanced, the for-profits in systems were subjected earlier to tenden cies to act in similar ways, whereas the tendencies for system-member nonprofits to act like for-profits did not develop until later.
Implications of partial support for the isomorphism argument are fundamental and far reaching. Nonprofit providers have traditionally operated with the mission of providing service to the community and the needy, including much charity care. By contrast, for-profit providers have been expected to operate with an eye to the bottom line. The in roads of for-profits in home health care is important enough in itself; but isomorphism arguments suggest that the effects are more far reach ing because nonprofits come to act like for-profits, leading to the conclu sion that access will become much more difficult.
Consistent with the neoinstitutional school of organizational theory, we found that a combination of environmental-policy factors has con tributed to trends toward for-profit health care (privatization) and greater organizational complexity (rationalization) in home health. Al though for-profit status and system membership may be seen as viable organizational strategies to reduce uncertainty and ensure survival, an important issue concerns the behavioral consequences of such organiza tional changes. z 94
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Tests of hypotheses about isomorphism were employed to help us fur ther understand how home health has become structured, the extent of homogenization between different types of HHAs, and the behavioral consequences for specific dimensions of access to care. Findings generally support the research of Schlesinger and associates on hospitals, in that measures of ownership, competition, and multifacility system/chain membership explain access to care in the home health industry. Consis tent with the findings for hospitals, we find that by 1987 there was a straightforward relationship in home health between tax status and ac cess, as measured by refusal to serve clients for whom there are payment issues.
We also find a different configuration of results, however. In contrast to Schlesinger and associates, we discover very competitive home health markets to be associated with lower service refusals and to be less differ entiated by tax status. System membership also reduces the difference between nonprofits and for-profits in service refusals to clients for pay ment reasons. This contrasts with hospitals, for which Schlesinger et al. (1987) report that "the influence of system status emphasizes the differences due to ownership." Our findings may vary from those of Schlesinger because of the dynamics of the different health care indus tries or as a result of changes occurring over time. Schlesinger's study was for the 1984 period, whereas ours covered both periods: 1984-86 and 1986-87; we found our major differentiation by organizational charac teristics for the later period. Further investigation is needed into the changing structure of the home health industry and the impact of tax status and system membership on access and other home health issues.
Findings suggest unanticipated, latent consequences of policy that fosters for-profit status and integration into systems. Public policy and changes promoting home health restructuring that favors selected types of HHAs (for-profit and system members), and isomorphic processes that reduce the differences between nonprofit and for-profit HHAs, lead to questions about the consequences for particular population groups. An important empirical question is the extent to which our findings may be explained by a cultural shift both in the expectations and the values of nonprofit organizations in the context of market rhetoric that marked the 1980s and in the policies governing the distribution of state resources. Schlesinger et al. (1987) and others have appropriately described the "subtle but pervasive shift in the expectations and values governing the relations be tween medical providers and the communities in which they are located" 2. 95 as one of the most fundamental aspects of health care privatization. The dramatic structural changes in the health care system and the deep insti tutional shifts at the ideological and meaning level require policy makers who are concerned about access to home health care to consider explicit policies for encouraging or protecting charitable behavior. These should include ways to reward HHAs that accept a "disproportionate share" of needy but uninsured patients. We agree with Schlesinger et al. (1987) that it behooves policy makers to "take a more active role in defining what is expected of health providers in a community."
